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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 15-2257 
_____________ 
  
APRIL ROSE HOCK, 
 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
  
COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY 
 
     ________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 5-13-cv-02329) 
District Judge: Honorable Petrese B. Tucker 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 12, 2016 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, AMBRO, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed April 6, 2016) 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Appellant April Rose Hock appeals her denial of disability insurance benefits.  
The District Court affirmed the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).  We 
agree. 
I. 
Ms. Hock applied for disability insurance benefits in July 2009, alleging disability 
as of January 2009 due to major depressive disorder and schizoaffective disorder.  Her 
initial application was denied at the administrative level and she requested an 
administrative hearing before an ALJ.  At the administrative hearing in June 2011, the 
ALJ heard testimony from Ms. Hock and a vocational expert.  In August 2011, the ALJ 
denied Ms. Hock’s claim for disability insurance benefits.  She decided that Ms. Hock 
was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act because she could 
perform numerous jobs in the national economy notwithstanding her credibly established 
limitations.  The ALJ found that Ms. Hock has the residual functional capacity to perform 
work at all exertional levels so long as (1) she was “confined to work involving simple, 
routine tasks[] not involving detailed instructions,” and (2) the work was “self-paced and 
low stress in nature, and require[d] no more than limited contact with the public and 
coworkers.”  (1 App. A13-A14.) 
In reaching her conclusion, the ALJ considered the opinions of four medical 
professionals: Dr. Ronald Sherman (an examining psychologist); Dr. Thomas Lane (the 
Social Security Administration’s consulting psychologist); Dr. Rosemary Horstmann (a 
treating psychiatrist); and Carl Sebastianelli, M.A. (the Social Security Administration’s 
non-examining psychologist).  The ALJ accorded little weight to Dr. Sherman’s opinion 
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because he saw Ms. Hock on only one occasion yet “recorded more extensive clinical 
findings and extreme limitations than even the treating source had identified.”  (1 App. 
A19.)  The ALJ accorded some weight to Dr. Lane’s opinion but discounted his 
conclusion that Ms. Hock’s limitations were only severe in a “work/public setting” 
because that conclusion was based solely on her self-reported symptoms and unsupported 
by the objective evidence in the record.  (1 App. A18-A19.)  That objective evidence 
showed, among other things, that Ms. Hock worked part-time at her father’s shop.  (Id.)  
The ALJ accorded “less weight” to Dr. Horstmann’s opinion, notwithstanding that she 
treated Ms. Hock, because the former’s opinion was unsupported by objective medical 
evidence in the record and was inconsistent with her own treatment notes and the level of 
treatment provided.  (1 App. A20.)  Ms. Hock’s symptoms improved when she took 
medication, according to Dr. Horstmann’s treatment notes, but the latter’s opinion did not 
account for that.  (Id.)  Finally, the ALJ accorded greater weight to Mr. Sebastianelli’s 
opinion, even though he did not treat Ms. Hock, because he considered “the longitudinal 
record” thoroughly and his assessments were “more consistent” with Ms. Hock’s overall 
treatment history.  (1 App. A19.)   
After the Appeals Council denied Ms. Hock’s request for review, she appealed the 
ALJ’s decision to the District Court.  The appeal was referred to a U.S. Magistrate Judge, 
who recommended affirming the denial of benefits.  The Court adopted the 
recommendation.  This timely appeal followed. 
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II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “The role of this Court is identical to that of 
the District Court, namely to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support 
the Commissioner’s decision.”  Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999).  
“Substantial evidence has been defined as ‘more than a mere scintilla.  It means such 
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.’”  Id. (quoting Ventura 
v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995)).  It “may be somewhat less than a 
preponderance of the evidence.”  Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 
2005). 
III. 
Ms. Hock claims that the ALJ erred for two reasons.  The first is that the ALJ 
failed to evaluate properly the medical evidence in determining her residual functional 
capacity.  Specifically, she argues that it was improper for the ALJ, based on the record, 
to discount the opinions of Dr. Sherman, Dr. Lane, and Dr. Horstmann while crediting 
Mr. Sebastianelli’s opinion.  
We disagree.  “[T]he ALJ is entitled to weigh all evidence in making [her] 
finding.”  Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 196 (3d Cir. 2011).  Here, the ALJ’s 
assessment of the various medical opinions in this case was based on her consideration of 
the objective evidence in the record, and it contained substantial evidence to support each 
of her conclusions.  The ALJ clearly explained that she gave greater weight to Mr. 
Sebastianelli’s opinion because it was consistent with the objective evidence in the record 
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and the overall history of Ms. Hock’s treatment.  His was the only opinion that took into 
account the evidence that Ms. Hock was able to perform numerous activities of personal 
care and daily living.  Ms. Hock argues that his opinion did not consider evidence that 
she cannot function in a work environment, but he specifically reported that she was able 
to understand, retain, and perform one- or two-step tasks, and evidence of Ms. Hock’s 
later part-time employment at her father’s body shop supports the ALJ’s decision to 
credit Mr. Sebastianelli’s conclusion.   
The ALJ also clearly explained that she gave less weight to the opinions of Dr. 
Sherman, Dr. Lane, and Dr. Horstmann because the severity of the limitations they 
reported were unsupported by or inconsistent with the objective record evidence.  For 
example, Dr. Lane’s report indicated that Ms. Hock was oriented and displayed normal 
speech, thought content, memory, and concentration, but that contradicted his opinion 
that she had extreme limitations in her ability to understand, remember, and carry out 
short instructions.  Similarly, the ALJ correctly observed that even though Dr. Sherman 
reported that (i) Ms. Hock was alert and oriented, (ii) her speech was clear and relevant, 
and (iii) her thought content was organized, he “recorded more extensive clinical findings 
and extreme limitations than even the treating source had identified.”  (1 App. A19.)  
Finally, Dr. Horstmann’s treatment notes show that Ms. Hock worked at her father’s 
body shop answering and directing calls for approximately ten hours a week and that she 
regularly babysat her friend’s young children.  Those activities were inconsistent with Dr. 
Horstmann’s finding that Ms. Hock had a marked limitation on normal workday and 
workweek activities.  As such, although there was record evidence suggesting a contrary 
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conclusion, the ALJ did not “‘reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason,’” 
Plummer, 186 F.3d at 429 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 
1066 (3d Cir.1993)), but rather articulated reasons for her decision that were supported 
by substantial evidence and were not contrary to law. 
Ms. Hock’s second argument is that the ALJ’s credibility determination was 
incorrect.  She argues that none of the ALJ’s reasons for finding her not credible 
“contradict a finding that [she] is incapable of withstanding the mental demands of full-
time competitive employment.”  (Hock Br. 40.) 
Again we disagree.  The ALJ’s credibility determination was supported by 
substantial evidence.  For example, the ALJ relied on evidence that Ms. Hock 
successfully took multiple trips to California by herself, but she claimed she could not 
travel more than a few miles from home without severe symptoms.  (1 App. A18.)  In 
addition to relying on evidence that Ms. Hock independently performed many activities 
of daily living, such as running errands outside her house, babysitting, and answering 
phones at her father’s shop, the ALJ relied on the absence of evidence in the record to 
corroborate the more severe limitations to which Ms. Hock testified.  As courts should 
“ordinarily defer to an ALJ’s credibility determination,” Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 
376, 380 (3d Cir. 2003), we hold that Ms. Hock has not presented sufficient reason for us 
to disturb the ALJ’s conclusion.  
* * * * * * 
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 We have considered Ms. Hock’s remaining arguments and find them 
unpersuasive.  Because the District Court correctly held that the ALJ’s decision was 
supported by substantial evidence, we affirm. 
 
